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ABSTRACT
New York v. United States, Printz v. United States, and Murphy v. NCAA each involved federal
laws that told a state to do, or not do something. And, in each case, the Supreme Court found that the federal
laws were unconstitutional because they violated the so-called “anticommandeering” doctrine. However, the Court
did not hold that any of these laws violated the Tenth Amendment, standing by itself. Rather, in each case, the
federal laws were unconstitutional because they exceeded the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers. Most recently,
Murphy acknowledged the issue, but ultimately tiptoed around the doctrine of enumerated powers.
Soon enough, the Supreme Court can restore doctrinal clarity in the percolating litigation over sanctuary cities. To
date, several courts have held that 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) is unconstitutional on its face. This law requires states
and their subdivisions to share information about unlawful aliens in their custody. Or more precisely, states cannot
enact laws that prevent their subdivisions from sharing that information with the federal government.
Regrettably, these courts have based their rulings solely on the Tenth Amendment, without discussing the scope of
Congress’s enumerated powers. Section 1373(a) is arguably a “necessary” means to carry into execution
Congress’s powers to establish a uniform system of naturalization laws. However, it cannot be “proper” for
Congress to accomplish that end by instructing states how to manage their law enforcement agencies. On appeal,
the Supreme Court should provide this textual explanation for why Section 1373(a) violates the
anticommandeering doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Pop quiz!
Which of the following federal laws did the Supreme Court find to violate
the Tenth Amendment?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

The “Take Title” provision in New York v. United States
The background-check mandate in Printz v. United States
The prohibition on state gambling laws in Murphy v. NCAA
All of the above
None of the above

The correct answer is E, but you will be forgiven for thinking it was D.
Judges, attorneys, law students, and even law professors routinely make this
common mistake. A federal law can no more violate the Tenth Amendment
than a state law can violate the Supremacy Clause. Rather, both clauses
“simply provide[ ] ‘a rule of decision.’”1
The Tenth Amendment tells us that “[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”2 This clause, added two
years after the ratification of the Constitution, contains three premises. First,
we ask if a power is delegated to Congress. For example, is that power
enumerated in Section 8 of Article I, in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or elsewhere? If the answer is yes, then the federal law is a
proper exercise of federal power. In addition, by virtue of the Supremacy
1
2

See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1479 (2018) (quoting Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr.,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015)).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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Clause, courts can “not give effect to [a] state law[ ] that conflict[s] with [this]
federal law[ ].”3
Second, if the answer is no, we ask if the Constitution prohibits the state
from exercising that power. For example, are the states prohibited from
taking such an action because of a limitation in Section 10 of Article I, in
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or elsewhere? If the answer to the
second question is no, then we move onto the third premise: Congress lacks
this power, and the Constitution does not bar the states from exercising this
power. Therefore, the states—and only the states—can exercise that power.
Justice O’Connor articulated a similar logic in New York v. United States: “If
a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment
expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is
an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is
necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.”4 Both
questions center around whether Congress or the states have the power to
do, or not do something. “It is in this sense,” Justice O’Connor observed,
“that the Tenth Amendment ‘states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered.’”5
Now that we’ve had a chance to articulate first principles, let’s review our
pop quiz. New York v. United States,6 Printz v. United States,7 and Murphy v. NCAA8
each involved federal laws that told a state to do, or not do something. And,
in each case, the Court found that the federal laws were unconstitutional
because they violated the so-called “anti-commandeering” doctrine.
However, the Court did not hold that any of these laws violated the Tenth
Amendment, standing by itself. Rather, in each case, the federal laws were
unconstitutional because they exceeded the scope of Congress’s enumerated
powers.
First, in New York, Congress lacked the power to force the states to enact
legislation and take title of radioactive waste. Second, in Printz, Congress
lacked the power to mandate that state officials must perform firearm
background checks. Third, in Murphy, Congress lacked the power to tell
states not to authorize gambling. Generally, Congress can regulate each of
these areas—radioactive waste, firearms, and gambling—through its powers
under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. However, in each
3
4
5
6
7
8

Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1383 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824)).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
Id. (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
New York, 505 U.S. at 156.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
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case, Congress ran afoul of the anticommandeering doctrine because these
laws were not “proper” exercises of federal power. New York made this point
implicitly. Printz,9 as well as National Federation of Independent Business (“NFIB”)
v. Sebelius,10 made the point explicitly. Most recently, Murphy acknowledged
the issue,11 but ultimately tiptoed around the doctrine of enumerated powers.
Soon enough, the Supreme Court can restore doctrinal clarity in the
percolating litigation over sanctuary cities. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) provides that
a “State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any
way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving
from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the
citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”12
The Trump Administration relied on Section 1373 to withhold federal
funding from so-called “sanctuary cities.”13 In response, those jurisdictions
have challenged those executive actions. To date, several district courts have
held that Section 1373 is unconstitutional on its face.14 Regrettably, these
courts have based their rulings solely on the Tenth Amendment, without
discussing the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers. On appeal, the
Supreme Court should provide a textual explanation for why Section 1373
violates the anticommandeering doctrine.
Part I traces the history of the anticommandeering doctrine from the First
Bank of the United States to McCulloch v. Maryland to Prigg v. Pennsylvania to
New York v. United States to Printz v. United States to NFIB v. Sebelius to Murphy v.
NCAA. Part II concludes that Section 1373(a) is arguably a “necessary”
means to carry into execution Congress’s powers to establish a uniform
system of immigration laws. However, it cannot be “proper” for Congress
to accomplish that end by instructing states how to manage their law
enforcement agencies.

9
10
11
12
13
14

Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24.
NFIB. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475–76.
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012).
Immigration 101: What Is a Sanctuary City?, AMERICA’S VOICE (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://americasvoice.org/blog/what-is-a-sanctuary-city/ (last updated Oct. 9, 2018).
See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Accordingly,
the Court holds that 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)–(b), insofar as it applies to states and localities, is facially
unconstitutional under the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment.”); City of
Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 872 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“In sum, Section 1373 impermissibly
directs the functioning of local government in contravention of Tenth Amendment principles
. . . .”); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 331 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“Section 1373
violates the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution . . . .”).
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I. COMMANDEERING IS NOT A “PROPER” EXERCISE OF FEDERAL
POWER
In recent years, the anticommandeering doctrine has “come to be
associated primarily with the Tenth Amendment.”15 This association is not
accurate. Rather, the anti-commandeering doctrine is best understood to
reflect the limited scope of Congress’s enumerated powers: laws that
command states to do, or not do something, may be “necessary” to
accomplish certain legitimate ends, but cannot be deemed “proper” exercises
of federal power. To understand New York v. United States and Printz v. United
States, we have to revisit the basis of the First Bank of the United States,
McCulloch v. Maryland, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania. In addition, NFIB v. Sebelius,
and more recently, Murphy v. NCAA shed some, but not enough light on the
foundation of commandeering. The Supreme Court has failed to precisely
articulate the textual basis of this principle. Part I takes up this mantle.
A. The First Bank of the United States and McCulloch v. Maryland
Following the ratification of the Constitution, our young Republic faced
serious financial problems. In 1790, Alexander Hamilton, the Secretary of
the Treasury proposed, the creation of a national bank to address these
issues.16 The bank would operate branches throughout the United States,
which could establish credit, accept deposits, and loan money to the new
national government.17 The power to incorporate a bank cannot be found
in the first seventeen clauses of Article I, Section 8. The bill to establish the
bank does not directly collect taxes. So that power is out. Nor does the bill
borrow money or regulate commerce. All of the other express powers are
likewise out. Only the eighteenth clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause,
could possibly support the power to incorporate the bank. It provides:
Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”18

15
16

17
18

Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is
Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 623 (2010).
Historical Highlights: The First Bank of the United States, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN [hereinafter
Historical Insights], https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1700s/1791_First_Bank/ (last
visited Apr. 1, 2019).
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

964

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:4

The debate in Congress and in the Executive Branch centered around
an important question: in order to execute the powers to collect taxes, borrow
money, or regulate commerce, is it “necessary and proper” for Congress to
charter a bank? Representative James Madison objected to the bank’s
constitutionality in a speech to Congress. He argued that the power to
incorporate a bank was not incidental to any of the enumerated powers.
Therefore, this “great and important power” needed to be enumerated in
the Constitution.19 In addition, Madison contended that it was not necessary
to incorporate a bank in order to collect taxes, borrow money, or regulate
commerce.20 He concluded that Congress lacked the power to incorporate
the bank.21
Despite Madison’s opposition, Congress approved the Bank.22 President
Washington asked members of his cabinet for their opinions on the Bank’s
constitutionality. Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of State, took an even
more stringent view of “necessary” than did Madison. Jefferson contended
that when “the constitution restrained [Congress] to the necessary means” of
executing its powers, Congress’s authority was limited to “those means
without which the grant of the power would be nugatory.”23 Because its goals
could be accomplished in other ways, it was not “necessary” to charter the
bank.
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, who first proposed the
idea of the national bank, strongly rejected Jefferson’s strict reading of
“necessary.” Instead he defined “necessary” as “needful, requisite,
incidental, useful, or conducive.”24 In other words, if it is “useful” for
Congress to charter a bank in order to collect taxes or borrow money, then
Congress has the power to do so.
Hamilton rejected any test of constitutionality that rested on the “degree
in which a measure is necessary,” or “the more or less of necessity or utility”
of a measure.25 However, he did not go so far as to say that Congress had
the discretion to adopt any means that, in its sole judgment, would be
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

James Madison, The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/
founders/documents/a1_8_18s9.html.
Id.
Id.
Historical Highlights, supra note 16.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of State, to George Washington, U.S. President, (Feb.
15, 1791), available at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-07-02-0207.
Hamilton’s Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, in THE FEDERALIST: A
COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 659 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1898).
Id. at 659–60.
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convenient to carry into execution other enumerated powers. Instead,
Hamilton offered the following test: “The relation between the measure and
the end; between the nature of the mean employed toward the execution of
a power, and the object of that power must be the criterion of
constitutionality.”26 Today, we would describe this approach as “meansends” scrutiny. President Washington may have agreed with Hamilton’s
opinion on the Bank’s constitutionality. Or he may have agreed with
Jefferson that, because the decision was a close one, he should defer to
Congress. In either event, in 1791, President Washington signed the bill into
law, and chartered the First Bank of the United States.27 It would remain in
business for two decades.
In 1816, Congress chartered a second bank of the United States.28
President James Madison signed the bill into law. Did he change his opinion
from two decades earlier about the meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause? In private correspondence, Madison defended the consistency of his
approach. He contended that it was proper to defer to the judgment of
several Congresses on the question of whether a bank was truly necessary to
execute its powers, especially given what he said was the bank’s “almost
necessity.”29
However, soon the bank became very unpopular.30 In 1818, the
Maryland General Assembly imposed a tax on the branch of the Bank of the
United States in Baltimore.31 The bank’s cashier, James William McCulloch,
refused to pay the tax. Maryland sued McCulloch to recover the money.32
The Maryland Court of Appeals ruled for the state.33 McCulloch then
appealed the case to the Supreme Court. He argued that the state could not
tax the federal institution.34 However, before the Court could decide if the
state tax was constitutional, it had to first decide if Congress had the power
to charter the federal bank. The debate from two decades earlier between
Jefferson and Madison on one side, and Hamilton on the other, would now
26
27
28
29

30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 660.
Historical Highlights, supra note 16.
Letter from Andrew Jackson, U.S. President, to John Coffee (Feb. 19, 1832), available at
https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/treasures_of_congress/text/page9_text.html.
Letter from James Madison, U.S. President, to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 185 (William C. Rives & Philip R. Fendall
eds., 1867).
Letter from Andrew Jackson, U.S. President, to John Coffee (Feb. 19, 1832), available at
https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/treasures_of_congress/text/page9_text.html.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317–18 (1819).
Id. at 318–19.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 318–19.
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be resolved by the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland.
Chief Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion. He rejected
Maryland’s very narrow reading of “necessary.” Though Marshall did not
cite Hamilton, the Chief Justice copied several portions of the Treasury
Secretary’s opinion on the bank almost verbatim. Hamilton defined
“necessary” as “needful,” “requisite,” “useful,” and “conducive.”35 Marshall
used the same four adjectives, but added the word “Convenient” at several
junctures in his opinion36—a term that Hamilton did not use as a synonym
for “necessary.” Marshall can be read as saying that Congress could do
whatever is “convenient” in order to execute its other enumerated powers.
Indeed, Marshall described the creation of a bank as “a convenient, a
useful, and essential instrument in the prosecution of its fiscal operations”
and “an appropriate mode of executing the powers of government.”37 He
rejected the notion that the federal bank must be an “absolute physical
necessity.”38 Marshall puts forward the following test, which, to this day, is
relied upon by the Supreme Court to determine the scope of Congress’s
implied powers: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional.”39
McCulloch held that the Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress a
power sufficient to incorporate the bank. As a result, Maryland could not
tax the federal bank, because “the power to tax involves the power to
destroy.”40 Marshall rejected the objection that the Constitution did not
specify a power to create a bank, on the ground that such specificity “would
partake of the prolixity of a legal code.”41 Instead, he declared, “we must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”42 He added: our
Constitution is “intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”43 In other words, to avoid
soon growing outdated, the Constitution speaks in more general terms.

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Hamilton’s Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, supra note 24, at 659.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 333, 354, 365, 367, 371, 409, 413.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 415.
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Much of Chief Justice Marshall’s decision focused on the construction of
the phrase “necessary.” Though, the Court offered a separate test to
determine if a law is also “proper.” Specifically, the Constitution “does not
license the exercise of any ‘great substantive and independent power[s]’
beyond those specifically enumerated.”44 Chief Justice Marshall did not
provide much guidance on how this test should be applied—that is, when
does a mere incidental power become a “great substantive and independent
power.” The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts would revisit this question
nearly two centuries later. Several decades later, the Court would expand
on the scope of “necessary” in the context of the Fugitive Slave Act.
B. The Fugitive Slave Act and Prigg v. Pennsylvania
In 1793, Congress enacted the Fugitive Slave Act, which authorized slave
catchers to travel across state lines and arrest runaway slaves.45 This federal
law was very unpopular. Several northern states that opposed slavery,
including Pennsylvania, enacted so-called “Personal Liberty Law.”46 These
statutes prevented a person’s removal from the state without a full judicial
proceeding—including a jury trial—to determine whether or not that person
was in fact a fugitive slave. These state laws conflicted with the federal act,
that included only the most minimal procedural protections.
Congress can only enact laws pursuant to one of its delegated powers.
What provision of the Constitution gave Congress the power to enact the
Fugitive Slave Act? One possible candidate is the Fugitive Slave Clause,
which appears in Article IV, Section 2. It provides: “No Person held to
Service or Labour in one State . . . escaping into another . . . shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be
due.”47 The text does not actually give Congress any new power to enact
that Fugitive Slave Act. Rather, the Clause merely governs the relations
between the states.
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
Congress lacked the enumerated powers to enact the Fugitive Slave Act.48
Justice Story wrote the majority opinion. He held that the Fugitive Slave Act
was constitutional because it was intended to prevent free states from
“intermeddling with, or obstructing, or abolishing the rights of the owners of
44
45
46
47
48

NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 559 (2012) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411).
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (amended 1850) (repealed 1864).
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 550 (1842).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
Prigg, 41 U.S. at 625–26.
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slaves.”49 He doubted that the Union could have even been formed if the
Fugitive Slave Clause had not been added to the Constitution.
But what about the argument that Article IV, Section 2 does not grant
Congress the power to enforce the Clause? Justice Story responded that the
Necessary and Proper Clause provides the necessary authority. He wrote:
“The end being required, it has been deemed a just and necessary
implication, that the means to accomplish it are given also; or, in other words,
that the power flows as a necessary means to accomplish the end.”50 This
construction by Justice Story in Prigg extends well beyond Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch. It remains one of the most expansive
readings of the Necessary and Proper Clause ever adopted by the Supreme
Court. In sum, because Justice Story found that that the Fugitive Slave Act
was made “in pursuance of” the Fugitive Slave Clause, and in conjunction
with the Necessary and Proper Clause, that act was “supreme” and
preempted the Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law.51 Prigg’s conviction was
therefore reversed.52
Justice Story also maintained that the states cannot be “compelled to
enforce” the Fugitive Slave Act.53 He added, “it might well be deemed an
unconstitutional exercise of the power of interpretation, to insist, that the
states are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the
national government, nowhere delegated or intrusted to them by the
constitution.”54 Rather, it is for the national government to carry into effect
its own policies.55 Specifically, in the context of the Fugitive Slave Act,
“where a claim is made by the owner, out of possession, for the delivery of a
slave, it must be made, if at all, against some other person.”56 In other words,
the Constitution authorizes Congress to mandate action by private parties,
pursuant to the Fugitive Slave Clause. However, that provision does not
allow Congress to commandeer state executive-branch officials.
Justice Story also opined on another aspect of the anticommandeering
doctrine: The Fugitive Slave Act required state judges to enforce the law.57
In an oft-forgotten portion of the opinion, Story found that state courts could

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 611.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 615–16.
Id.
Id. at 616.
See Josh Blackman, State Judicial Sovereignty, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2033, 2056–57.
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be exempted from enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act if state legislatures
deprived them of jurisdiction to hear such cases.58 After all, courts without
jurisdiction can do nothing. Justice Story found the Fugitive Slave Act “to
be clearly constitutional, in all its leading provisions, and, indeed, with the
exception of that part which confers authority upon state magistrates.”59 He continued:
[With respect to the] authority so conferred upon state magistrates, while a
difference of opinion has existed, and may exist still, on the point, in different
states, whether state magistrates are bound to act under it, none is
entertained by this court, that state magistrates may, if they choose, exercise
that authority, unless prohibited by state legislation.60

In the normal course, state courts of general jurisdiction were obligated to
enforce federal law.61
However, the states were under no obligation to confer such jurisdiction
on their own courts. Justice Story does not even entertain the notion that
Congress could confer jurisdiction on a state court to entertain certain claims.
Nor could Congress compel a state legislature to confer such jurisdiction on
their state courts to carry out the Fugitive Slave Act. In this regard, Prigg
foreshadowed the question presented in New York v. United States.62 Justice
Thomas’s dissent in Haywood v. Drown noted this facet of Prigg: state courts
could not “be compelled to enforce” the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.63 Justice
Stevens’s majority opinion in Haywood, alas, disregarded Prigg.64
In the aftermath of Prigg, many states deprived their state judges of subject
matter jurisdiction concerning the Fugitive Slave Act.65 As a result, federal
agents were unable to enforce the law without the benefit of state courts.
Congress obviated this problem with the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.66 This
far-more draconian law established federal commissioners in every county

58
59
60
61

62
63
64
65

66

Prigg, 41 U.S. at 622.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Cf. Paul Finkelman, The Roots of Printz: Proslavery Constitutionalism, National Law Enforcement, Federalism,
and Local Cooperation, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1399, 1410 (2004) (“In the years after Prigg a number of
northern judges simply refused to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, even though under Prigg
they were legally free to do so, and in Story’s eyes had a constitutional or even moral obligation to
do so.”).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 764 n.8 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Prigg, 41 U.S. at
615).
Blackman, supra note 57, at 2059.
Finkelman, supra note 61, at 1411 (“A number of states followed Story’s ‘hint’—if that is what it can
be called—and prohibited their judges from hearing cases under the federal Fugitive Slaw Law of
1793.”).
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864).
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who could decide and enforce fugitive slave cases.67 As a result, federal
agents would no longer have to rely on state courts. This approach, in a way,
promoted federal aims while respecting federalism.68
What was the basis for Justice Story’s ruling? Prigg teaches that Congress
cannot mandate, or commandeer, state executive- and legislative-branch
officials to take certain actions. But why are courts different? The answer
may be derived from Article VI of the Constitution. Pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause, the “judges in every state shall be bound” by the
“Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof.”69 In contrast, pursuant to the Oaths Clause, “Members
of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers . . . of
the several States” are “bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution.”70 State judges are bound by the former clause. State
executive, legislative, and judicial officers are bound by the latter clause. The
Constitution is silent about the precise distinction between being bound by the
Constitution and being bound to support the Constitution. But there is a textual
difference between the two provisions—a textual difference that is reinforced
by Justice Story’s Prigg dichotomy between the executive and legislative, and
judicial branches.
To this day, McCulloch remains the definitive account of the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Prigg, perhaps due to its odious subject matter, is seldom
cited in discussions about commandeering.71 Over a century later,
commandeering cases decided by the Rehnquist and Roberts Court would
harken back to Chief Justice Marshall, but not to Justice Story.
C. Commandeering State Legislatures to Enact Legislation and New York v. United
States
In 1985, only three states had facilities that disposed of low-level
radioactive waste.72 In response, Congress enacted a law that created
incentives for states to provide for waste generated within their border.73 The
67
68

69
70
71
72
73

Finkelman, supra note 61, at 1413.
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 961–62 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As a general
matter, Congress has followed the sound policy of authorizing federal agencies and federal agents
to administer federal programs.”).
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
Id.
Finkelman, supra note 61, at 1400 (“Oddly, none of the opinions in [Printz] mentioned the first
Supreme Court case to deal with these issues, Prigg v. Pennsylvania.”).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 151 (1992).
Id.
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most severe incentive was the so-called “Take Title” provision.74 If a state
could not provide a disposal facility, the state must take title, or ownership,
of waste generated by private parties within the state.75 Furthermore, the
state would be liable for all damages that results from the waste.76 New York
challenged the constitutionality of this law.77 The state acknowledged that
the federal government could regulate the interstate waste market, but
Congress could not force the state to take ownership of private radioactive
waste.78
Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion. She agreed with New
York: “Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program.’”79 In other words, Congress lacked the power to force
the state legislature to enact new laws that assume title and liability for the
radioactive waste. Congress had other means to encourage the states to take
title of radioactive waste. For example, it could provide money to the states
with strings attached, like in South Dakota v. Dole.80 Or Congress could
preempt waste disposal and impose a uniform federal standard nationwide.
But it could not force the state legislatures to enact such laws itself. (Justice
Story’s opinion in Prigg supported this holding, but Justice O’Connor did not
mention it.) Justice O’Connor recognized the importance of federalism in
our system of government. “The Constitution divides authority between
federal and state governments,” she wrote, “for the protection of
individuals.”81
The commandeering cases, including New York, are often described as
Tenth Amendment cases. However, Justice O’Connor said the Tenth
Amendment was not relevant to her analysis, not directly at least. “The
Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress,” she wrote,
“but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself,
which, as we have discussed, is essentially a tautology.”82
Let’s revisit this concept using the three premises identified in the
Introduction. First, we ask if a power is delegated to Congress? For example,
can Congress require New York to take title of the radioactive waste pursuant

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 153–54.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 161 (alteration in original).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 156–57.
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to its powers under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause
clauses? If the answer is yes, then Congress can exercise that power.
However, the New York Court answered that question no. It is certainly
necessary—that is “conducive”—for Congress to require states to deal with
the nationwide problem of radioactive waste disposal. However, it is not a
“proper” exercise of federal power to require the state legislature to enact
laws that take title of the waste.
Second, we ask if the Constitution prohibits the state from taking that
action. The Constitution of 1789 listed several prohibitions in Article I,
Section 10.83 For example, states cannot enact bills of attainder or ex post
facto laws.84 Subsequently, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments placed additional restrictions on the states. However, the
Constitution says nothing about how New York can or can’t deal with
radioactive waste.
Therefore, third, the decision of how to handle the waste is reserved to
the state. Congress lacks the power to tell the state how to exercise that
power. The Tenth Amendment, standing by itself, adds nothing to the
Court’s analysis.85 If Congress lacks the power to force states to pass a statute,
then the states retain the power to deal, or not deal, with the waste.
New York implicitly stands for an important proposition: while the “Take
Title” provision may be a “necessary” means to regulate the interstate waste
market, requiring a state to legislate is an intrusion into state sovereignty, and
is therefore not a “proper” exercise of federal power. That this
anticommandeering principle rests on the meaning of “proper” in the
Necessary and Proper Clause: would not become explicit until Printz v. United
States.86
This 1997 decision considered whether Congress could
commandeer state executive branch officials.87

83

84
85

86
87

Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018) (“The Constitution limits state sovereignty in
several ways. It directly prohibits the States from exercising some attributes of sovereignty.” (citing
U.S. CONST. art I, § 10)).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 n.13 (1997) (“This argument also falsely presumes that
the Tenth Amendment is the exclusive textual source of protection for principles of federalism. Our
system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional provisions [. . .] and not only
those, like the Tenth Amendment, that speak to the point explicitly.”).
Id. at 898.
Id.
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D. Commandeering State Executive-Branch Officials and Printz v. United States
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act imposed a wide range of
new gun control laws.88 One provision required the attorney general to
establish a new national database.89 This system would allow federal firearm
dealers to instantly check the background of prospective handgun
purchasers.90 Developing that electronic system would take some time.
During the interim, the federal law “command[ed] state and local law
enforcement officers”—CLEOs—“to conduct background checks on
prospective handgun purchasers.”91 The law was challenged by several
sheriffs, including Jay Printz of Ravali County, Montana, and Richard Mack
of Graham County, Arizona.92 The CLEOs argued that the federal
government could not force them to perform background checks, and delay
people in their communities from purchasing firearms.93
The Court split 5-4 in favor of the Sheriffs. Justice Scalia wrote the
majority opinion. He extended New York’s rubric, and found that Congress
also lacked the power to commandeer state executive-branch officials.94 The
majority disagreed with Justice Stevens’s dissent, which—according to the
majority—contended that the Brady Act was valid “because the Tenth
Amendment imposes no limitations on the exercise of delegated powers.”95
The dissent also stated that the Necessary and Proper Clause was an
“affirmative delegation of power in Article I” that “provides ample authority
for the congressional enactment.”96
Justice Scalia responded that the Necessary and Proper Clause was “the
last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action.”97 He
stated explicitly what Justice O’Connor had implied in New York v. United
States: to ascertain if a federal law falls within the scope of Congress’s powers
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, courts must separately ask whether
a law is both “necessary” and “proper.” Justice Scalia stated the rule
succinctly: “When a ‘La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce
Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty . . . it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 902.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 905.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 923 (majority opinion).
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carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,’ and is thus, in the words of
The Federalist, ‘merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation’ which ‘deserve[s] to be
treated as such.’”98
The Brady Act provision very well may have been a “necessary”—that is
conducive—means to regulate the interstate firearms market. However,
forcing Sheriffs to perform background checks was not a “proper” exercise
of federal power. Such a law violated the principle of state sovereignty
reflected in the Tenth Amendment and other structural provisions of our
Constitution. The Tenth Amendment, standing by itself, did not provide the
rule of decision. Rather, the Tenth Amendment merely informed the
Necessary and Proper Clause analysis.
The Printz Court explained that its decision five years earlier in New York
v. United States reflected the same principle: federal laws that commanded
states to regulate interstate commerce may be deemed necessary, but are not
a proper exercise of federal power.99 In both Printz and New York, the federal
laws were not proper because they intruded on the principles of state
sovereignty. Therefore, these laws were beyond the scope of Congress’s
express and implied enumerated powers. Justice Scalia would return to this
theme in his concurrence in Bond v. United States.100 He explained that “[n]o
law that flattens the principle of state sovereignty, whether or not ‘necessary,’
can be said to be ‘proper.’”101 This proper framework turned on a due respect
for state sovereignty.
Against this backdrop Justice Scalia cited several early statutes “enacted
by the first Congresses [that] required state courts” to take action concerning
matters of naturalization.102 The first Naturalization Act of 1790, for
example, provided that an alien “may be admitted to become a citizen
thereof, on application to any common law Court of record, in any one of
the states.”103 The law further provided that the state court “shall administer”
the oath, accept “proof” that “he is a person of good character,” and the

98
99

100
101
102
103

Id. at 923–24 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (emphasis added)).
Id. at 924 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“[E]ven where Congress
has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks
the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts. . . . [T]he Commerce
Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not
authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”)).
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2101 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 905–06.
United States Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).
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“Clerk of such Court shall record such application.”104 The provision with
the mandatory “shall,” Scalia suggested, imposed an affirmative obligation
on the state judges.105
A subsequent Naturalization Act passed in 1798 directed the “clerk, or
other recording officer of the [state] court before whom a declaration has
been, or shall be made, by any alien, of his intention to become a citizen of
the United States, to certify and transmit to the office of the Secretary of State
of the United States.”106 Justice Scalia explains that intrusions on state
courts’ jurisdiction were limited to judicial matters: “the Constitution was
originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to
enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters
appropriate for the judicial power.”107
Paradoxically, Justice Scalia does not cite Prigg in Printz.108 Prigg expressly
held that Congress could compel state courts of competent jurisdiction to
enforce federal laws.109 Printz sub silentio reaffirmed Justice Story’s dichotomy.
That is, Congress can commandeer state courts, but not state executive or
legislative branch officials. And textually, this rule can be derived from the
text of “the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, [which] announced that ‘the
Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.’”110 Justice Scalia explained that
judges, unlike legislatures or executives, “applied the law of other sovereigns
all the time.”111 In “so-called ‘transitory’ causes of action . . . laws which
operated elsewhere created obligations in justice that courts of the forum
State would enforce.”112 This principle is also implicit in the Full Faith and
104
105

106
107
108

109
110
111
112

See id. § 1 (emphasis added).
Cf. Nora Rotter Tillman & Seth Barrett Tillman, A Fragment on Shall and May, 50 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 453, 454 (2008) (“For example, legal discussions frequently focus on the alleged distinction
between the use of (the mandatory) shall and (the permissive) may in the Constitution of 1787. But
this distinction may very well be a victim of presentism.”).
Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, § 2, 1 Stat. 567.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 907 (second emphasis added).
Finkelman, supra note 61, at 1409–10 (“Oddly, Justice Scalia did not cite Prigg to bolster his
contention that the law at issue in Printz was unconstitutional, even though he could have mustered
the intellectual support of Justice Story. Perhaps Justice Scalia did not do so because he would have
been citing a case that otherwise supported slavery and was indeed, next to Dred Scott, the most
important judicial support for slavery in our constitutional jurisprudence.”).
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625–26 (1842).
Printz, 521 U.S. at 907 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (citing McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241, 247–249 (1843) (“And it also appears from the
authorities which have been cited, that in a transitory action of trespass, it is only necessary to lay a
venue for a place of trial, and that such venue is good without stating where the trespass was in fact
committed, with a scilicet of the county in which the action is brought.”)).
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Credit Clause, which “generally required such enforcement with respect to
obligations arising in other States.”113 Thus, it is “understandable why courts
should have been viewed distinctively in this regard.”114
In dissent, Justice Stevens vigorously disagreed with the “suggestion that
. . . the reference to judges in the Supremacy Clause . . . implied expressio unius
. . . that the Framers . . . did not intend to permit the enlistment of other state
officials.”115
Following his retirement, Justice Stevens proposed a
constitutional amendment to rebut the expressio unius implication of the
Supremacy Clause, and “to eliminate the rule” in Printz.116 As amended,
Article VI would now read as follows, with the alterations emphasized:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges and other public officials in every state shall be bound thereby, anything
in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.117

Stevens explained that by “[a]dding just four words—‘and other public
officials’—immediately after the word ‘Judges’ in the Supremacy Clause
would, under the Court’s reasoning, expressly confirm the power of Congress
to impose mandatory duties on public officials in every state.”118 Justice
Stevens’s proposed amendment reaffirms the textual distinction that Justice
Scalia drew in Printz, and Justice Story recognized in Prigg.
The distinction between “necessary” and “proper” makes its next
appearance in the Affordable Care Act case, NFIB v. Sebelius.
E. Commandeering the People and NFIB v. Sebelius
Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius provided
the most authoritative, and significant application of the proper test. He
concluded that the Affordable Care Act’s “individual mandate [to purchase
health insurance] cannot be sustained under the Necessary and Proper
Clause as an essential component of the insurance reforms.”119 Unlike past
exercises of implied power that were upheld, Chief Justice Roberts observed
that the mandate’s “authority” is “in no way . . . ‘narrow in scope.’”120 Nor
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Id.
Id.
Id. at 969 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE
CONSTITUTION 29 (2014).
Id. at 29–31.
Id.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 560 (2012).
Id. (quoting United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 148 (2010)).
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was the individual mandate merely “‘incidental’ to the exercise of the
commerce power.”121 Rather, the individual mandate “work[ed] a
substantial expansion of federal authority.”122 Why? Because under “such a
conception” of federal power, “Congress could reach beyond the natural
limit of its authority and draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise
would be outside of it.”123 In other words, Congress would be able to regulate
people it otherwise could not regulate. Such a law is unconstitutional,
because—invoking Chief Justice Marshall’s framework from McCulloch—it
“involve[s] the exercise of a[ ] ‘great substantive and independent power.’”124
Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts observed, “[e]ven if the individual mandate
is ‘necessary’ to the Act’s insurance reforms, such an expansion of federal
power is not a ‘proper’ means for making those reforms effective.”125
The joint opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito
elaborated on this framework—somewhat. They explained that a federal
law is improper “not only when the congressional action directly violates the
sovereignty of the States but also when it violates the background principle
of enumerated (and hence limited) federal power.”126 For example,
Congress’s efforts to regulate guns in school zones,127 and domestic
violence,128 ran afoul of that “background principle.”
The Chief Justice’s framework left much to be desired. In dissent, Justice
Ginsburg posed the critical questions left unanswered: “How is a judge to
decide, when ruling on the constitutionality of a federal statute, whether
Congress employed an ‘independent power,’ or merely a ‘derivative’ one?
Whether the power used is ‘substantive,’ or just ‘incidental’?”129 At bottom,
she observed, the lower courts are offered little guidance: “You will know it
when you see it.”130 I don’t disagree with Justice Ginsburg’s admonitions.
Yet, NFIB added a new layer to the anticommandeering doctrine. New
York held that Congress lacks the enumerated powers to compel state
legislatures to enact legislation.131 Printz held that Congress lacks the
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 561 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411).
Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
Id. at 653 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–63 (1995)).
Id. (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609–19 (2000)).
Id. at 621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part).
Id.
See discussion supra Section I.C.
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enumerated power to compel state executive branch officials to enforce
federal legislation.132 And NFIB held that Congress lacks the enumerated
power to compel the people to engage in commercial transactions.133 Such
an authority would force the people to “bring themselves within the sphere
of federal regulation.”134 That is, all Americans could be commandeered by
the federal power—whether they entered the stream of commerce, or not.135
In each of these three cases, the mandates may have been “necessary”—that
is conducive—to implement a legitimate end. However, the mandates on
the legislatures, the executive branch, and the people themselves, were not
proper exercises of federal power. In particular, the Affordable Care Act’s
individual mandate was not proper because of its unprecedented reach into
private conduct. The Tenth Amendment informs this inquiry, for it speaks
of the powers “reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”136 But
the mandates at issue in New York, Printz, and NFIB do not violate the Tenth
Amendment standing by itself. The next case, Murphy v. NCAA, expanded
the scope of New York v. United States.
F. Commandeering States Not to Enact Legislation and Murphy v. NCAA
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”)
“generally makes it unlawful for a State to ‘authorize’ sports gambling
schemes.”137 While the “Take Title” provision in New York commanded
states to enact specific legislation, PASPA did just the opposite: it
commanded states not to enact specific legislation. New Jersey wanted “to
legalize sports gambling at casinos and horseracing tracks.”138 However,
doing so would have violated the federal law. Therefore, the Garden State
challenged the constitutionality of this provision of PASPA.
In Murphy v. NCAA, six Justices held that the law ran afoul of the
anticommandeering doctrine.139 Three Justices, in dissent, “assum[ed]
arguendo” that the challenged part of PASPA was unconstitutional, but found
that other provisions of the law should be severed.140 Two of the dissenters—

132
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See discussion supra Section I.D.
See discussion supra Section I.E.
NFIB, 567 U.S. at 560.
See generally Barnett, supra note 15 (discussing why the Supreme Court could find the Affordable
Care Act unconstitutional).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1468 (2018) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2012)).
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1468.
Id. at 1475.
Id. at 1488–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Justices Ginsburg and Breyer—joined the Printz dissent two decades earlier.
Yet, they now accepted—or at least declined to reject—a doctrine that
Justice Stevens concluded had no basis in the text or history of the
Constitution.141 Justice Kagan joined Murphy without reservation.
Justice Alito’s majority opinion conceded that “[t]he anticommandeering
doctrine may sound arcane, but it is simply the expression of a fundamental
structural decision incorporated into the Constitution.”142 He maintained
that these principles “did not emerge in our cases until relatively recently,
when Congress attempted in a few isolated instances to extend its authority
in unprecedented ways.”143 (Justice Alito, like Justice Scalia before him, did not
identify the application of the anticommandeering doctrine in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania.) In several contexts, the Constitution “indirectly restricts the
States by granting certain legislative powers to Congress, see Art. I, § 8.”144
Under the Supremacy Clause, he continued, “when federal and state law
conflict, federal law prevails and state law is preempted.”145
Yet, the scope of this preemptive force is limited. Why? Though “sizable,
[the legislative powers granted to Congress] are not unlimited.”146 Beyond
the “certain enumerated powers” that the Constitution delegates to
Congress, “all other legislative power is reserved for the States, as the Tenth
Amendment confirms.”147 Here, the key word is confirms. The Tenth
Amendment does not allocate power between the federal government and
the states. Rather, the Tenth Amendment merely recognizes the structure
that is implicit in the Constitution. A law that runs afoul of this allocation
does not violate the Tenth Amendment.
Does Article I, Section 8 authorize Congress “to issue direct orders to the
governments of the States”?148 Justice Alito answered no.149 Such a power
is “conspicuously absent” from the Constitution.150 That power cannot be
found in Commerce Clause. Nor can it be found in “the last, best hope of
those who defend ultra vires congressional action, the Necessary and Proper
Clause.”151 The Framers chose “to withhold from Congress the power to
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
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151

Id.
Id. at 1475 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1476 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997).
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issue orders directly to the States,” which “retained ‘a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty.’”152 Justice Alito added, “[t]he anticommandeering
doctrine simply represents the recognition of this limit on congressional
authority.”153
Justice Alito identified three “significant” “reasons” to “explain[ ] why
adherence to the anticommandeering principle is important.”154 First, he
found that this doctrine “serves as ‘one of the Constitution’s structural
protections of liberty.’”155 Second, he continued, “the anticommandeering
rule promotes political accountability.”156 Third, he concluded, “the
anticommandeering principle prevents Congress from shifting the costs of
regulation to the States.”157
Given this framework, PASPA “violates the anticommandeering rule”
because it “unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not
do.”158 Through PASPA, Congress sought to put “state legislatures . . .
under the direct control of Congress.”159 PASPA presumes that “federal
officers were installed in state legislative chambers and were armed with the
authority to stop legislators from voting on any offending proposals.”160
Justice Alito concluded, “[a] more direct affront to state sovereignty is not
easy to imagine.”161
The result in Murphy flows from New York and Printz. Justice Alito’s
majority opinion attempted to synthesize the doctrines from those cases.
However, in the process, he erased the necessary-but-not-proper analysis.
Indeed, the majority opinion failed to anchor its analysis in the text of the
Constitution.
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, concisely articulated this
doctrine, like Justice Scalia did two decades earlier. He found that Congress
152
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Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 98, at 245 (James
Madison). But cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454 (1793) (“To the Constitution of
the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown. There is but one place where it
could have been used with propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported
with the delicacy of those, who ordained and established that Constitution. They might have
announced themselves ‘SOVEREIGN’ people of the United States: But serenely conscious of the
fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.” (emphases omitted)).
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476.
Id. at 1477.
Id. (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 921).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1478.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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lacks the enumerated power to commandeer the states: PASPA “exceeds
Congress’ Article I authority to the extent it prohibits New Jersey from
‘authoriz[ing]’ or ‘licens[ing]’ sports gambling.”162 To reach this conclusion,
Justice Thomas ruled out the two most common grants of authority in
Article I, Section 8. First, the Commerce Clause “does not authorize
Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate
commerce.”163 Second, “[t]he Necessary and Proper Clause does not give
Congress this power either.”164 Here, Justice Thomas articulated the textual
reason why commandeering is unconstitutional: “a law is not ‘proper’ if it
‘subvert[s] basic principles of federalism and dual sovereignty.’”165 PASPA,
which commandeers the states, “subverts those principles.”166 Justice
Thomas got Printz exactly right. The majority got it wrong.
There is a downside to Justice Alito’s majority opinion: lower court judges
will be able to disregard the text of the Constitution, with ease. Instead,
courts will—as they are wont to do—weigh the majority’s three principles as a
balancing test to determine if a given law runs afoul of the
anticommandeering doctrine. Imagine the colloquy: Well, this law frustrates
political accountability, but doesn’t shift that many costs to the state, and has only a
minimal infringement on individual liberty, so the law passes muster. This trend will
mask the doctrinal underpinnings of New York and Printz: federal laws that are
not “proper” exercises of federal power.
More importantly, Murphy fails to shine any light on other types of
improper federal laws that do not commandeer. To date, the Supreme
Court has only used this framework to declare unconstitutional laws that
impose mandates on states or the people. However, other laws that fall short
of commandeering may still not be proper exercises of federal power.167 As
a result, Murphy allows the lower courts to disregard the “proper” framework,
and treat commandeering laws as an isolated subset of constitutional law that
has no bearing on other elements of the scope of Congress’s powers. This
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Id. at 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2012)).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166
(1992)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 65 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
Id. (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997)).
See Brief for Cato Institute & Professors of Constitutional Law as Amici Curiae Supporting PlaintiffAppellee at 30, People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
852 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 2017) (Nos. 14-4151 & 14-4165) (“Any construction of the Necessary and
Proper Clause that upholds the ‘take’ regulation of the Utah prairie dog necessarily upholds a
broad, unenumerated power to regulate the ecology of each individual state. This regulation is
both unnecessary and improper.”).
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outcome is unfortunate. Fortunately, Murphy’s omission can be remedied in
a future case concerning sanctuary cities.
II. SECTION 1373(A) IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) provides that a “State, or local government entity or
official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or
official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service [“INS”] information regarding the citizenship or
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”168 (The
Department of Homeland Security now performs this role in the place of the
defunct-INS.) This law requires states and their subdivisions to share
information about unlawful aliens in their custody. Or more precisely, states
cannot enact laws that prevent their subdivisions from sharing that
information with the federal government.
This two-decade-old law169 has taken on a new salience as part of the
Trump Administration’s ongoing litigation concerning so-called “sanctuary
cities.”170 Specifically, the federal government argues that this law requires
the states to tell the federal government where and when a given alien will be
released from custody.171
That way, Immigration and Customer
Enforcement (“ICE”) agents can safely arrest and detain the alien. However,
as a threshold matter, this statute only applies to a specific category of
information: “the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of
any individual.”172 The law in no way requires the state to share information
about an alien’s release date or location. Therefore, the statute is largely
unhelpful. The federal government already knows an alien’s “citizenship or
immigration status.”173 ICE seeks custody of that alien, precisely because it
already has such information in its possession. The statute is silent about the
precise information the government needs—where and when the alien will
be released. Ultimately, Congress enacted a statute that fails to serve the
present-day needs of the executive branch.

168
169

170

171
172
173

8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012).
Section 1373 was signed into law on August 22, 1996. Printz v. United States was argued on December
3, 1996 and was decided six months later on June 27, 1997. Query if Congress anticipated Printz
when the immigration law was enacted.
See Ilya Shapiro & Josh Blackman, Testing California’s ‘Sanctuary’ Laws, CATO INST. (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/testing-californias-sanctuary-laws
(discussing
the constitutional implications of two California sanctuary laws challenged by the Trump
Administration).
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).
Id.
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This Article, therefore, will not consider whether Section 1373 is
unconstitutional as applied to the current sanctuary city litigation. Rather, I
will focus on the broader question: whether the law is unconstitutional on its
face. First, I will consider Section 1373 under Murphy’s approach. Second,
I will turn to Printz’s necessary-but-not proper rubric. These analyses yield
slightly different outcomes. This distinction at one demonstrates the
pliability of Justice Alito’s atextual commandeering analysis.
A. Section 1373 and Murphy
Let’s start with the Murphy-three-step. First, does shielding states from
the enforcement of Section 1373 “protect[ ] . . . liberty”?174 The sanctuary
cities would unquestionably contend that the federal law infringes the
freedoms of immigrants in their communities. The so-called “sanctuary”
laws are enacted precisely to protect aliens from federal immigration
enforcement—much like the personal liberal laws were enacted two
centuries earlier to protect runaway slaves from the Fugitive Slave Act.175
The federal government would counter that Section 1373 prevents states
from harboring criminals who seek to evade federal law enforcement
officials. How can people be free, the argument goes, unless they are safe to
live their lives? This question brings to mind Abraham Lincoln’s famous
parable about liberty: “The world has never had a good definition of the
word liberty, and the American people, just now, are much in want of one.
We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the
same thing.”176
Does liberty protect the right of aliens in sanctuary city to avoid ICE
agents? Or does liberty ensure that criminal aliens in sanctuary cities are
brought to justice to promote the general welfare?
Moreover, unlike the regulation of radioactive waste or firearms—areas
where states have plenary authority—the federal government has, under
modern doctrine177 at least, exclusive jurisdiction over immigration. New York
174
175
176

177

Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018) (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
921 (1997)).
See discussion supra Section I.B.
President Abraham Lincoln, Address at Sanitary Fair, Baltimore, Maryland (Apr. 18, 1864), in 7
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1863–1864, at 301–03 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953)
(emphasis omitted).
See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 419 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“In fact, the controversy surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts involved a debate over
whether, under the Constitution, the States had exclusive authority to enact such immigration laws.”).
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recognized that “‘the Constitution divides authority between federal and
state governments for the protection of individuals.’”178 Did the Constitution
settle this balance between federal and state power for the protection of
liberty with respect to immigration? The first factor invariably turns on
difficult value judgments about which regime more effectively promotes
liberty.
Second, does Section 1373 “blur[ ]” political accountability?179 The
states will argue yes: local officials will be forced to comply with unpopular
immigration policies, even against the wishes of their constituents. The
federal government will counter that the federal government has plenary
authority over immigration in all regards. Therefore, local voters who are
unhappy with immigration laws can seek a change at the federal level. Here,
the states have the stronger argument.
Third, does Section 1373 “shift[ ] the costs of regulation to the States”?180
The cost here is likely minimal. States that already know a person’s
immigration status can readily share that information with the federal
government. Unlike with handling of radioactive waste, or performing of
firearm background checks, Section 1373’s cost is de minimis.
At bottom, these three factors are somewhat inconclusive as applied to
Section 1373. Were I to weigh these concerns, the scale would tip towards
unconstitutional. But a credible argument can be made to the contrary. Does
that then mean the question is open under Murphy? No. Justice Alito’s
formalistic test decisively resolves the issue. Through Section 1373, Congress
“unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do.”181
Specifically, the sanctuary states may not enact laws that protect information
about the immigration status of aliens in their jurisdiction. Section 1373
places “state legislatures . . . under the direct control of Congress.”182 This
federal law imposes a “direct affront to state sovereignty.”183
Yet, this holding is somewhat unsatisfying. Why is this law such an
“affront”?184 The answer can be found through a careful study of Article I,
Section 8, and the allocation of powers between Congress and the states.

178
179
180
181
182
183
184

Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1478 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
See id.
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B. Section 1373 Is Not a “Proper” Exercise of Federal Power
All exercises of federal power must be supported by a delegation of
authority from the Constitution.185 The regulations at issue in New York,
Printz, and Murphy could be defended as exercises of Congress’s powers under
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The
framework from these three cases, however, does not carry over to Section
1373. This federal regulation of sanctuary cities does not purport to regulate
interstate commerce or intrastate economic activity.186 Rather, the law
mandates disclosure of information concerning an alien’s immigration status.
Section 1373 cannot be supported by Congress’s powers under the
Commerce Clause, the Naturalization Clause, and the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
1. Section 1373 Cannot Be Supported by Congress’s Power over Interstate or
Foreign Commerce
In New York, Printz, and Murphy, the Court did not question whether
Congress could regulate interstate markets of radioactive waste, firearms, and
gambling.187 For example, Congress could preempt state laws concerning
these three fields, and use federal agents to enforce those laws.188 Nor did
the Court in those cases doubt that Congress could regulate intrastate markets
of radioactive waste, firearms, and gambling so long as those activities had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.189 This latter analysis, premised
on the Necessary and Proper Clause framework from Wickard v. Filburn,
185
186
187

188

189

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012).
See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159–60 (1992) (“Petitioners do not contend that
Congress lacks the power to regulate the disposal of low level radioactive waste. Space in
radioactive waste disposal sites is frequently sold by residents of one State to residents of another.
Regulation of the resulting interstate market in waste disposal is therefore well within Congress’
authority under the Commerce Clause.”); cf. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“But even assuming the Commerce Clause allows Congress to prohibit intrastate sports gambling
‘directly,’ it ‘does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate
commerce.’” (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 166)).
Cf. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481 (“In sum, regardless of the language sometimes used by Congress
and this Court, every form of preemption is based on a federal law that regulates the conduct of
private actors, not the States. Once this is understood, it is clear that the PASPA provision
prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling is not a preemption provision because there is no
way in which this provision can be understood as a regulation of private actors.”).
Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Even if we construe
Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce to encompass those intrastate transactions that
‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce, I question whether Congress can regulate the particular
transactions at issue here.”).
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serves as the basis for virtually all federal regulations: Congress can regulate
intrastate economic activity that has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.190 That is, Congress carries into execution its power to regulate
interstate commerce by enacting laws that are necessary and proper to
regulate intrastate economic activity.
However, the challenged laws at issue in New York, Printz, and Murphy did
not merely regulate interstate and intrastate markets for radioactive waste,
firearms, and gambling. Rather, the laws mandated states to regulate those
areas.191 Under McCulloch, forcing states to take such actions is a necessary—
that is “conducive”—means to police these three areas.192 If the states take
such action, then the federal government does not need to assert itself.
However, such regulations were not a proper way to achieve legitimate ends.
Stated simply, it is not proper for Congress to mandate states to regulate
intrastate economic activity.193
This analysis does not provide the rule of decision for Section 1373. In
United States v. Lopez, the Court held that Congress could not regulate
noneconomic intrastate activity, even if that activity had a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.194 However, where intrastate “economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity
will be sustained.”195 However narrow this test may seem, Gonzales v. Raich
provided a capacious definition of “economics”: “the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities.”196 Section 1373 regulates a

190

191

192

193

194
195
196

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (“Congress may properly have considered that
wheat consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have
a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased
prices.”).
See New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (“The allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause, for
example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize
Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”).
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819) (“[T]he power of punishment
appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised, whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as
incidental to his constitutional powers. . . . It is a right incidental to the power, and conducive to its
beneficial exercise.”).
See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24 (“When a ‘La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce
Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions
we mentioned earlier, it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,’
and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, ‘merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation’ which ‘deserve[s] to be
treated as such.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 98, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton))).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Economics,
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966)).
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single state sharing information. This activity is non-economic and cannot
be aggregated under Wickard.
The Commerce Clause may be relevant in a different context. Article I,
Section 8, Clause 3 provides: Congress has the power to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.”197 As understood in 1791, “commerce” was limited to some
sort of “intercourse,” or perhaps “social interaction.”198 Under modern
doctrine, the movement of people can constitute “commerce.”199 The
federal government could potentially argue that Section 1373 is a necessary
and proper means to regulate the movement of aliens between states, and to
regulate aliens who travel from foreign nations into the states. For example,
Congress may not know the identity of an alien who journeys across a border
into a sanctuary state. Section 1373 would require the state to disclose to the
federal government the immigration status of any new immigrants. With this
understanding, Congress could link Section 1373 to its power to regulate
foreign commerce: receiving such information makes federal immigration
schemes more efficient. As a result, the mandate to provide the information
would be a necessary, that is a conducive means to regulate foreign commerce.
Ultimately, this argument fails for reasons discussed in the next part: even if
these means are necessary, they are not proper exercises of federal power.
2. Section 1373 Cannot Be Supported by Congress’s Power over Naturalization
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 grants Congress the power “[t]o establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”200 This provision offers the strongest basis
to support the constitutionality of Section 1373. Indeed, this Clause serves
as the basis for modern immigration laws. (Though, as an original matter,
the phrase “naturalization” is best understood to refer to grants of
citizenship; not a plenary power to regulate immigration.201) Moreover,
several Supreme Court decisions have suggested that Congress has an inherent
power over foreign and domestic immigration.202 Even Justice Scalia—
197
198
199
200
201

202

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (2010); Randy E. Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 101 n.3 (2001).
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255–56 (1964).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
See Ilya Somin, Does the Constitution Give the Federal Government Power Over Immigration?, CATO
UNBOUND (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2018/09/12/ilya-somin/doesconstitution-give-federal-government-power-over-immigration.
See e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an accepted maxim of
international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential
to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only
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usually a stickler for the separation of powers—acquiesced to this doctrine.
He admitted that “there was no need [for the Framers] to set forth control of
immigration as one of the enumerated powers of Congress.”203 The notion
of an unenumerated power over immigration stands in tension with our
Constitution’s structural design. It is a bedrock principle that the federal
government only has those powers that are enumerated in the
Constitution.204
In any case, under modern doctrine, Congress has the power to regulate
domestic immigration.205 And Congress can use this power to authorize
federal officers to obtain the immigration status of aliens in all fifty states.
Obtaining such information would—under modern doctrine—promote a
“uniform Rule of Naturalization.” Can Congress accomplish this goal by
requiring states to share such information with the federal government? This
approach would certainly be a “necessary”—that is conducive—means to
promote a uniform immigration scheme nationwide. After all, the system
would be frustrated if the government had information about aliens in
cooperative states, but no information about aliens in sanctuary states.
Under the Court’s case law stretching from McCulloch to the present, such a
regulation would be a necessary means to carry into execution an enumerated
power. But is that approach also proper?
To answer this question, let’s consider how Section 1373 operates in
practice. At the outset, someone in state government wants to share
information with the federal government concerning a person’s “citizenship
or immigration status.”206 Someone else, who ranks higher in state
government, takes steps to “prohibit, or . . . restrict” the “sending” of such
information.207 Generally, this sort of conflict is resolved internally: higher-

203
204
205

206
207

in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. In the United States this power
is vested in the national government, to which the constitution has committed the entire control of
international relations, in peace as well as in war.” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)).
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 422 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893)).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“The Constitution creates a Federal Government
of enumerated powers.”).
The basis of a federal power over domestic immigration law has largely been under-theorized, and
ill-explained, by the Supreme Court. See Ilya Somin, Immigration, Freedom, and the Constitution, 40
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2017) (arguing that Congress does not have the power to regulate
immigration); Josh Blackman, The Power to Exclude (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265780 (arguing that Congress does not have plenary power over
immigration, but does have the power to deny entry of aliens). But see John C. Eastman, The Power
to Control Immigration Is a Core Aspect of Sovereignty, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9 (2017) (discussing
that Congress does have the power to regulate immigration).
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012).
Id.
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ranked state officials can instruct lower-ranked state officials how to act. This
dynamic can play out in a mundane fashion: a sheriff tells a deputy not to
coordinate with ICE. Or—as in the case of California—the state mandates
that all entities within the state (such as cities, counties, prisons, etc.) must
refuse to share the requisite information with the federal government. In our
Republic, states are free from federal control. However, political
subdivisions exist at the pleasure, and indeed absolute control, of the state.
There is no internal equivalent of federalism for cities and states. In the
absence of Section 1373, there would be no question that states could issue
such edicts.
Section 1373 distorts that dynamic. Congress has instructed higher-ups
in the states how they must manage their subordinates. That is, Congress
has told sheriffs how to supervise their deputies, and has told state houses
how to legislate over their subdivisions. Moreover, local officials are
forbidden by federal law from implementing sanctuary policies favored by
their constituents. Section 1373 is not a “proper” exercise of federal power:
Congress cannot direct a state how to manage its workforce. In other words,
the federal government cannot dictate how a state controls its own law
enforcement agencies, pursuant to its police powers. Congress retains the
authority to withhold federal subsidies from states that deviate from federal
standards. Congress cannot, however, intercede in such internal affairs. For
these reasons, Section 1373 cannot be a proper exercise of federal power.
CONCLUSION
Section 1373(a) is unconstitutional on its face. The courts can reach that
result through a rote application of Murphy v. NCAA. Taking this approach,
however, would pay insufficient attention to the constitutional foundation of
the anticommandeering doctrine. Specifically, Section 1373(a), though
perhaps a “necessary” means to establish a uniform naturalization scheme,
is not a “proper” means to accomplish that goal. Are we merely quibbling
over semantics? No. The distinction between these two outcomes transcends
nomenclature.
For generations, students of McCulloch assumed that the Necessary and
Proper Clause was a blank check for federal power. Congress could choose
whatever means were convenient to carry into exaction one of its enumerated
powers. Following Wickard v. Filburn, which embraced the substantial effects
test, even intrastate economic activity supported federal regulation. In
addition, this presumption was especially well-founded in the immigration
context, where Congress has plenary, and perhaps even inherent power.
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However, Printz and NFIB unsettled that presumption. These cases
reaffirmed the principle that laws must be both “necessary” and “proper” to
“carry[ ] into Execution the foregoing Powers” in Article I, Section 8—
including the power to regulate interstate commerce and naturalization.208
It is not enough that a law makes it convenient for Congress to do its job.
Courts must also carefully scrutinize whether the law does so in an improper
fashion. That is, did Congress recognize the scope of its own authority, or
did it intrude on the prerogatives of the states?
Judges following Murphy may be tempted to hide behind the veneer of the
Tenth Amendment—a provision that has no teeth. This approach, alas,
enables courts to sidestep a core aspect of the judicial role that many scholars
thought was abandoned decades ago: the enforcement of the doctrine of
enumerated powers. Judges that declare Section 1373 unconstitutional
should embrace their decisions for what they are: furthering the project of
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts to chisel away at the New Deal settlement.
This enterprise does not entail overturning well-entrenched precedents like
Wickard v. Filburn. Rather, in the words of Randy Barnett, the Court has
declared: this far, but no farther.209 Moreover, acknowledging the basis of their
rulings would make it plain that other similar federal laws, that stop short of
commandeering, are also in constitutional doubt.
There is, for some judges at least, a silver lining to the Murphy approach.
A decision halting Section 1373 will simply be a one-off: a way to reject
federal intrusions on the states in the sanctuary city context, without
imposing any collateral damage on other species of federal invasions. Judges
can rule against Section 1373—and the Trump Administration—and then
continue to rubber-stamp all manner of federal laws that overstep proper
bounds. Many fair-weather federalists would find this pathway attractive as
a stopgap measure while an undesirable President resides in the White
House.210 However, full-time federalists—including those on the Supreme
Court—should place the anticommandeering doctrine in its proper context,
such that all improper laws now bear the constitutional bullseye they deserve.
208
209

210

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
See Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (and Why Did So Many Law Professors
Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331, 1348 (2013) (“This gestalt can be summarized as ‘this far and
no further’— provided ‘no further’ is not taken as an absolute, but merely as establishing a baseline
beyond which serious justification is needed.” (citation omitted)); see also Josh Blackman, Originalism’s
Gravitational Pull Towards Original Meaning, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Nov. 18, 2012),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/11/18/originalisms-gravitational-pull-towards-originalmeaning/.
See Josh Blackman, How the States Can Help Trump Make Federalism Great Again, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 18,
2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/01/federalism-state-attorneys-generaldonald-trump-should-work-entrench-federalism/.

